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INTRODUCTION
What can the law do to improve teacher quality? In answering this ques-
tion, one can be forgiven for thinking about regulation rather than litigation. At
the federal level, most litigation-heavy education laws are antidiscrimination
statutes, focused on protecting certain categories of students rather than on en-
forcing high teaching standards.2 Meanwhile, teacher quality has become a cen-
tral aspect of education "policy" statutes.3 Lax teacher preparation standards
and poor hiring policies, in particular, create challenges for the education sys-
tem. Good teachers not only increase students' scores on standardized tests;
they also can lower students' teen pregnancy rates, increase their likelihood of
going to college, and raise their lifetime incomes. 4 Replacing poor teachers with
average ones can have similar effects.' Yet white and wealthy students are far
more likely to be taught by high-quality educators than are minority and eco-
nomically disadvantaged students.6 The teacher quality crisis in the United
States is real, and it contributes greatly to the broader woes of the American ed-
ucation system.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-which is over half a century old,
and which is primarily understood as an antidiscrimination provision-may
offer a solution to this crisis. Title VI forbids racial discrimination in the provi-
sion of resources in federally funded programs.' The U.S. Department of Edu-
cation has recently made clear that teacher quality is, in fact, a resource covered
by Title VI.' This Note argues that Title VI complaints, investigations, and law-
suits can encourage (or force) districts to pursue policies that are designed to
2. These statutes include Title IV and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000c-6, 200oc-8, 20ood-1 (2012), which cover race, color, and national origin;
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012), which co-
vers sex; the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f)
(2012), which covers English language learner status; and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2012), Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12133, 12188 (2012), and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (2012), all of which cover disability status.
3. See the discussion of No Child Left Behind and the Every Student Succeeds Act,
infra Section I.C.




6. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
7. The antidiscrimination mandate states: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
8. See infra Part II.
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provide minority students with better teachers. While other scholars have dis-
cussed Title VI in relation to school discipline,' assignment of students to spe-
cial education, 0 school finance," school reconstitution, 2 and general educa-
tional discrimination," this is the first piece of legal scholarship to discuss Title
VI in any depth in relation to teacher quality and teacher assignment.
Part I of the Note provides background on the racial and socioeconomic
gaps that plague American education generally and access to good teachers in
particular. Teacher quality is one of the most important factors contributing to
student academic growth, yet recent attempts to alleviate these disparities
through legislation have failed. Part II charts out a different course: the U.S.
Departments of Education and Justice should make more aggressive use of Title
VI to end unequal access to quality teachers. Part II explains the mechanics of
Title VI and illustrates how Title VI investigations might play out in the teach-
ing context. Parts III and IV then discuss a number of concerns that this new
use of Title VI could generate. Part III lays out and resolves two issues related to
the Title VI doctrinal test: how to measure teacher quality and how to handle
state and school district defenses to allegations of discrimination. Part IV then
tackles two larger concerns: (i) how to ensure that private parties will submit
complaints to the Department of Education, as Title VI requires, while also
guaranteeing that the potential flood of new claims will be promptly resolved;
and (2) how the agencies can protect their Title VI guidance, and their disparate
impact regulations, from legal challenge.
9. See, e.g., Zachary W. Best, Note, Derailing the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track: Title
VI and a New Approach to Disparate Impact Analysis in Public Education, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1671 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled
Class, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 1237; Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrim-
ination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and
Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 407 (2001).
n1. See, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals To Link
Educational Adequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process Challenges, 7
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 17-31 (2002); Julie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of
School Finance and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
527, 549, 553-54 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Andrew Spitser, Comment, School Reconstitution Under No Child Left Be-
hind: Why School Officials Should Think Twice, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1339, 1360-61
(2007).
13. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: Acknowledging
That Race Discrimination in Public Education Is More than Just a Tort, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 99, 99-102 (2001); Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Oppor-
tunity in Education: No Conflict ofLaws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1016-17 (2001).
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I. TEACHER QUALITY AND INEQUALITY
For at least three decades, we have been told that the American education
system is in crisis.'4 If anything, the reform drumbeat has intensified in recent
years, becoming an important part of the national political dialogue. This
sense of crisis is often expressed in terms of America's falling standing in the
world as demonstrated by the nation's rankings on international standardized
tests. For instance, on the 2012 Programme for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA), American students performed a dismal 1 7th in reading, 20th in
science, and 27 th in math out of thirty-five participating nations." These prob-
lems are in large part due to yawning achievement gaps between white and
wealthy students, on the one hand, and minority and disadvantaged students,
on the other. Teacher effectiveness is distributed in much the same, unequal
manner. Because the quality of a child's teacher is the largest in-school factor
contributing to student achievement, these racial and socioeconomic gaps are
of particular concern to policymakers.
A. The Achievement Gap and the Importance of Teacher Quality
America's poor academic standing is due in substantial part to its racial and
economic achievement gaps. Cognitive differences between white and black ba-
bies emerge as early as two years old, and by the time they enter kindergarten
African-American children already lag behind whites by 0.64 standard devia-
tions in math and 0.4 in reading scores.17 By the end of first grade, the gap wid-
14. See, e.g., David P. Gardner et al., A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational
Reform, NAT'L COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE EDUC. 5 (1983), http://teachertenure
.procon.org/sourcefiles/a-nation-at-risk-tenure-april-1983.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QA99-RSGC].
15. See, e.g., NCLB Reauthorization: Examining Strategies for Attracting, Supporting,
and Retaining High Quality Educators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, & Pensions, noth Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions); Ulrich Boser et al.,
A Look at the Education Crisis: Tests, Standards, and the Future of American Educa-
tion, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 26, 2016, 10:59 AM), http://www.american
progress.org/issues/education/report/2o16/ol/26/129547/a-look-at-the-education-
crisis [http://perma.cc/SM9X-Z42L]; Chris Farrell & Bill Radke, Solving the U.S.
Education Crisis, MARKETPLACE (July 1, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.marketplace
.org/2010/07/01/ife/solving-us-education-crisis [http://perma.cc/VY5B-8X36].
16. Country Note: Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results,
United States, OECD 1 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/PISA-2o12-
results-US.pdf [http://perma.cc/4AV3-RL5R].
17. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score
Gap in the First Two Years of School, 86 REv. ECON. & STAT. 447, 449 (2004).
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ens to anywhere from one half to a full standard deviation in reading, and near-
ly three-quarters of a standard deviation in math.'
This trend continues throughout schooling. An analysis done by the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics found that the United States' 2009 PISA
reading scores varied widely by race: Asian-American and white students scored
statistically significantly higher than both the United States and Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) averages, while Hispan-
ic and African-American students performed significantly worse than those av-
erages.' 9 The results would land Asian-American students in first place within
the OECD, just ahead of Korea, while American white students would be third
in the OECD rankings, behind Finland and ahead of Canada. Hispanic stu-
dents, meanwhile, would find themselves in thirty-second place, between Aus-
tria and Turkey, while African-American students would be in thirty-fourth,
behind every OECD nation except Mexico.2 0 On average, the American public
school system is not failing white and Asian students-it is perpetuating the
condition of those who are already disadvantaged.
Social scientists have conducted a great deal of research to determine what
causes this achievement gap, and which methods are most effective at improv-
ing academic performance. They have identified several factors, and some are
far more influential than others. Non-school factors, such as race, socioeco-
nomic status, and parents' education, have the largest effect, usually explaining
more than half the variation in student performance.21 Children of parents with
economic, educational, and social advantages begin school better prepared and
better able to learn." However, the quality of the school system is important in
its own right. One study has found that white-black achievement gaps are only
one-third as large within a given school as they are nationally-suggesting that
much of the gap is caused by African-Americans attending worse schools than
white students.2 3 And, of all the school-based factors contributing to education-
18. Id.
19. H.L. Fleischman et al., Highlights from PISA 2009: Performance of U.S. 15-Year-Old
Students in Reading, Mathematics, and Science Literacy in an International Context,
U.S. DEP'T EDUC. & INST. EDUC. SC. 14 (Dec. 2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/
2011004.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZ7P-QKHR].
20. Id. at 8, 14.
21. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 14 (2004);
Gillian Hampden-Thompson & Jamie Johnston, Variation in the Relationship Be-
tween Nonschool Factors and Student Achievement on International Assessments,
U.S. DEP'T EDUC. & INST. EDUC. SCI. 2 (Apr. 2006), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2oo6/
2006014 .pdf [http://perma.cc/XEJ8-GFR4].
22. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 21, at 17.
23. Fryer & Levitt, supra note 17, at 448.
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al inequality, the quality of a child's teacher appears to have the greatest effect
on student achievement, dwarfing other components such as class size.2 4
The idea that teacher quality matters is not particularly surprising. While
Finland and Norway, for instance, are quite similar in culture and socioeco-
nomic structure, Finland's superior system of teacher education, among other
education policy choices, has led to far better student achievement than seen in
Norway." Empirical data also affirm the importance of good teaching. One me-
ta-analysis found that teacher effects accounted for seven to twenty-one percent
of the variation in student performance.2 6 These numbers might not sound like
much, but the effects are more powerful than they first appear. In fact, there is
some belief among education scholars that a succession of good teachers can
narrow or even eliminate the achievement gap. A number of studies have found
that moving from a below-average teacher to an above-average one, or from an
average teacher to an excellent one, can increase achievement gains by one-
third to one-half of a standard deviation in a single year. 27 The policy implica-
tions of these numbers are enormous. Using even a conservative estimate of
teacher effects, moving from an average teacher to an excellent teacher for four
to five years in a row would completely eliminate the achievement gap." Better
teachers can also increase their students' lifetime earnings, 9 and improving
teacher quality nationwide can even strengthen the gross domestic product.30
There are, of course, caveats to this research. First, teachers affect the learn-
ing of all of their students; good teaching may not eliminate the achievement
gap, but instead just increase all students' achievement equally. Still, a focus on
guaranteeing high-quality teachers for minority-heavy schools would tend to
increase minority students' achievement in particular. Second, because students
are not randomly assigned to teachers-better-informed parents can steer their
24. See, e.g., Spyros Konstantopoulos, Trends of School Effects on Student Achievement:
Evidence from NLS:72, HSB:82, and NELS:92, 108 TCHRS. C. REC. 2550, 2577 (20o6);
Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73
ECONOMETRICA 417, 419 (2005); S. Paul Wright et al., Teacher and Classroom Con-
text Effects on Student Achievement: Implications for Teacher Evaluation, n1 J.
PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 11, 57, 61 (1997).
25. Isak Ladegaard, Big Differences in Finnish and Norwegian Teacher Education,
SCIENCENORDIC (Dec. 12, 2012, 6:53 AM), http://sciencenordic.com/big-differences
-finnish-and-norwegian-teacher-education [http://perma.cc/BP82-BEMK].
26. Barbara Nye et al., How Large Are Teacher Effects?, 26 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y
ANALYSIS 237, 240, 253 (2004).
27. Id. at 253.
28. Eric Hanushek, Teacher Deselection, in CREATING A NEW TEACHING PROFESSION 165,
172 (Daniel Goldhaber & Jane Hannaway eds., 2009).
29. Raj Chetty et al., Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and
Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2633, 2634 (2014).
30. Hanushek, supra note 28, at 174, 176.
194
35:189 2016
OLD DOG, NEW TRICKS: TITLE VI AND TEACHER EQUITY
children toward higher-quality teachers, for instance-the findings of these
studies may not be as robust as they appear on their face. Third, and most im-
portantly, the research assumes that one could perfectly identify teacher quality
and replace the worst teachers with better ones. Since, at least for the moment,
there are no perfect predictors of teacher quality available, these effect estimates
are likely to be overstated. " In other words, interventions to improve the teach-
ing force will not have the full power that these analyses suggest, because ad-
ministrators cannot tell with certainty which teachers are more or less effective.
Limitations of geography and reputation will also prevent school districts from
hiring exclusively excellent teachers. It is important, therefore, to temper expec-
tations in regards to these data.
B. The Reality of Teacher Inequality
The research does make one thing quite plain, however: teacher quality is
the largest in-school factor that determines student achievement. And, indeed,
"[e]ffective teachers appear to be effective with students of all achievement lev-
els, regardless of the level of heterogeneity in their classrooms." 32 Assigning
high-quality teachers to students who need them, therefore, is an important du-
ty for school districts and an important equal protection issue. However, teach-
er assignment between high- and low-minority schools is anything but equita-
ble. For example, research shows that majoring in the subject one teaches is an
important factor in student achievement, particularly in middle school and high
school.33 But classes in high-minority schools are nearly 40% more likely to be
taught by teachers who neither majored nor minored in their subject than are
classes in low-minority schools. 34
Additionally, teachers with at least three years of experience are significant-
ly more effective on average than those with little teaching experience, and
teachers may see quality gains for their first decade or more in the profession. 35
Yet "schools with the most low-income and minority students employ almost
twice the proportion of teachers with fewer than three years of experience as
31. Nye et al., supra note 26, at 253.
32. Wright et al., supra note 24, at 63.
33. See Educational Resource Disparities for Minority & Low-Income Children: Quick
Facts, CHILD. DEF. FUND 1 (Jan. 2004), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/
data/resource-disparities.pdf [http://perma.cc/UHA4-KQ4A].
34. Heather G. Peske & Kati Haycock, Teaching Inequality: How Poor and Minority
Students Are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality, EDUC. TR. 2 (June 20o6), http://files
.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED494820.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9RS-XXW5].
35. See Stephen Sawchuk, New Studies Find that, for Teachers, Experience Really Does
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higher-income and lower-minority schools."3 6 And even those who have been
on the job longer do not perform as well in disadvantaged areas. Inexperienced
teachers have approximately the same effect in both high- and low-poverty
schools, but experienced teachers tend to be more effective in low-poverty
schools than in high-poverty schools.37 This creates a double disadvantage for
impoverished and minority students: they tend to have less experienced teach-
ers, and even their experienced teachers are worse than those in wealthier, whit-
er schools."
These inequities are due at least in part to differences in teacher turnover, a
problem that takes a disproportionate toll on high-minority schools. National-
ly, about thirty percent of teachers leave the profession within their first five
years. 39 However, annual teacher turnover is nearly thirty percent higher in
schools that have mainly free or reduced-price lunch students than in schools
with few such students.40 Even more disturbingly, teachers are more than twice
as likely to transfer out of high-poverty schools than they do out of low-poverty
schools. 4 1 While poverty and race are of course different measures, the two are
correlated, and researchers have found that teachers also leave high-minority
schools at higher rates than they do low-minority schools. 42 This is problematic
because teacher turnover can have a negative effect on student achievement-
and the effect is significantly worse in schools with sizeable minority popula-
tions than in white-heavy schools. 43 In short, minority students are receiving
the short end of the teacher-quality stick.
36. Lindsey Luebchow, Equitable Resources in Low Income Schools: Teacher Equity and




37. Glenda L. Partee, Attaining Equitable Distribution of Effective Teachers in Public




39. Matthew Ronfeldt et al., How Teacher Turnover Harms Student Achievement, 50
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 4, 5 (2013).
40. Rebecca Goldring et al., Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results from the 2012-13
Teacher Follow- Up Survey, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. & INST. EDUC. SCI. 8 (Sept. 2014),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2o14/2o14o77.pdf [http://perma.cc/D4ZK-DL751.
41. Id.
42. Ronfeldt et al., supra note 39, at 22.
43. Id. at 23, 25.
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C. Existing Legal Avenues for Pursuing Teacher Equity
Until now, efforts to improve teacher equity have focused either on Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),44 or on state constitutional lawsuits. 45 Two pro-
visions of NCLB were particularly relevant to teacher assignment and quality.
First, it required that all school districts move toward a one hundred percent
rate of "highly qualified" teachers by 2oo6.46 However, the requirements for
new teachers to be deemed "highly qualified" were far from rigorous. Teachers
only needed to have a bachelor's degree, become certified as a teacher, and
prove that they actually knew the subjects they taught.47 These looked more like
the bare minimum requirements to become a teacher than anything deserving
the label "highly qualified." Because states could set the passing scores for
teacher certification exams-and, indeed, many of them set the bar very low-
they had a great deal of latitude in meeting NCLB's mandate.48 Moreover, for
teachers already on the job, school districts could count everything from their
years of experience to attendance at meetings to the giving of presentations as
credit toward "highly qualified" status.49 Thus, while new teachers had to prove
that they had at least some content knowledge of their subjects, previously hired
teachers did not even have to meet this most basic of standards. 50
Even with such a low bar, states found it difficult to meet the law's mandate
when it came to disadvantaged schools. For instance, a study of the Ohio system
found that one out of eight teachers in high-minority schools did not meet the
"highly qualified" standard, as opposed to only one out of every sixty-seven in
low-minority schools." Nationally, high-minority and high-poverty schools
maintained about three times as many unqualified teachers as did other
44. See, e.g., Luebchow, supra note 36, at 3-4; Partee, supra note 37, at 4o; Peske & Hay-
cock, supra note 34, at 1o.
45. See, e.g., Jared S. Buszin, Comment, Beyond School Finance: Refocusing Education
Reform Litigation To Realize the Deferred Dream of Education Equality and Adequa-
cy, 62 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1621 (2013).
46. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, tit. II, § In1(a)(2)-(3), 115 Stat. 1425, 1505-1506
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2)) (repealed 2015).
47. New No Child Left Behind Flexibility: Highly Qualified Teachers, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/methods/teachers/hqtflexibility.html [http://perma.cc/
CBB7-VS7N].
48. DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID FEDERAL
REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 152 (2009).
49. Id.; JESSE H. RHODES, AN EDUCATION IN POLITICS: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
No CHILD LEFT BEHIND 156-57 (2012).
50. RHODES, supra note 49, at 157.
51. Luebchow, supra note 36, at 6.
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schools." And, in the end, the requirement seemed to have little effect on teach-
er quality. In one survey, thirty-eight percent of state respondents and seventy-
four percent of district respondents reported that the mandate made little or no
difference to the effectiveness of their workforces.53 The much-maligned re-
quirement was repealed in 2015 by the successor to NCLB, the Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA).1 4
NCLB conditioned federal education funding on the requirement that each
district provide services to federally funded, high-poverty schools that "are at
least comparable to services in [low-poverty] schools that are not receiving
funds."55 However, this has not proven to be an effective lever for regulating
teacher quality across schools. "Under current law, two schools within the same
school district may be deemed 'comparably resourced' even if the teachers in
one school are far more experienced, and therefore receive higher salaries, than
those in a neighboring school." 6 Districts accomplish this feat by using "salary
averaging," in which they take the average salary of teachers in the district and
write their budgets as though every teacher received that salary.5" By doing this,
the number of teachers in a school becomes the sole measure by which the fed-
eral government can determine whether high-poverty schools and low-poverty
schools receive comparable teaching resources.5' This loophole allows school
districts to get away with placing less effective teachers in high-minority
schools, as long as salary scales are similar for similar experience levels across
the district. It also leads to even greater intra-district funding disparities, be-
cause districts hire inexperienced, inexpensive teachers for their high-poverty
schools and thereby can divert some of their federal funding to pay for their
more experienced teachers in low-poverty schools. 59
The current form of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is our
most up-to-date federal education law, meant to deal with our current educa-
tion policy needs. Yet it has failed to counter the teacher inequality crisis. If
anything, the replacement of NCLB with ESSA makes the law even less relevant
to teaching. Aside from eliminating the "highly qualified" standard, ESSA gives
states near-complete control over how to assess student achievement and teach-
52. COHEN & MOFFIrr, supra note 48, at 153.
53. Id.
54. Kaylan Connally, How Will ESSA Influence States' Teacher Quality Efforts?, NEW
AM. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.newamerica.orgleducation-policy/edcentral/essa
teacherquality [http://perma.cc/9QSS-QMUT].
55. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(1) (2012); see Luebchow, supra note 36, at 3.
56. Luebchow, supra note 36, at 3.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id.
59. Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Within-District Spending Inequities Help
Some Schools To Fail, 2004 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. POL'Y 201, 212.
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er performance."o It also prohibits the Department of Education from incentiv-
izing states to adopt common academic standards."'
Meanwhile, the main avenue for education reform litigation has been at the
state level. After the Supreme Court effectively cut off federal constitutional
challenges to education systems in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,6" advocates began to bring cases in state courts under state constitu-
tions.6 3 At first, these cases took the form of state equal protection claims, chal-
lenging the inequitable resources provided to poor and minority-heavy school
districts.64 Equity cases were of limited effect: only about half were successful;
those courts that did rule against the states required only equalization of fund-
ing, not of teacher quality or of student opportunities more generally; and polit-
ical resistance to funding equity led states to reduce spending in wealthy dis-
tricts rather than increase spending in poor districts." Ultimately, each
marginal dollar did more to improve quality in rich than in poor districts."6
The focus then shifted to adequacy-based claims, arguing that the educa-
tion clauses in every state's constitution required that every student receive a
certain minimum level of educational quality.7 State courts were more willing
to entertain these suits and eventually managed to develop standards to define
adequacy.6' However, even the adequacy cases have been disappointing to re-
form advocates. They have mitigated some of the inequality in funding between
districts, but school finance has proven to be too blunt a mechanism to improve
educational quality.69
One problem is that the decisions in state constitutional cases almost never
tackle teaching as a discrete concern. 70 Of the twenty-six state high courts to or-
der funding equality, only two-in Tennessee and Wyoming-engaged in any-
6o. Gregory Korte, The Every Student Succeeds Act vs. No Child Left Behind: What's




62. 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973).
63. Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The
First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1343, 1360 (2010).
64. Id. at 1361.
65. Id. at 1362-63, 1365.
66. Winston, supra note 13, at 1013.
67. Black, supra note 63, at 1364-65.
68. Id. at 1365.
69. Id. at 1370.
70. Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1597,
1601 (2016).
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thing close to a thorough and accurate analysis of teacher quality issues." A re-
cent trial court decision holding Connecticut's education system to be uncon-
stitutional also analyzed the state's teacher compensation and evaluation meth-
ods in detail.72 But state constitutional cases are inefficient, even when they
succeed in affecting teaching. The Connecticut litigation lasted for eleven years
before the trial court's judgment,3 and since the state has appealed the trial
court's ruling, 7 4 it is guaranteed an even longer life. The Tennessee and Wyo-
ming cases took fourteen and nine years, respectively, to wind their way
through the court system."
A quicker method has arisen recently: a group of reform advocates has filed
cases claiming that teacher tenure deprives students of their right to an ade-
quate education.' A California trial court struck down a state tenure statute in
2014, only two years after the case was filed." But the state appellate court re-
versed the ruling,7' and the California Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.79 Beyond the doctrinal hurdles that such tenure challenges may face, how-
ever, they are simply misguided. There is no empirical evidence to support the
idea that tenure is the cause of inadequate teaching.so Like other previous at-
tempts to improve teacher quality through the law, tenure suits have failed to
get the job done.
71. Id. at 1635.
72. Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ., Inc. v. Rell, No. Xo7HHDCV4503756 5 S, 2016
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2183, at *73-85 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2016).
73. Id. at *1o6.
74. Matthew Kauffman, Supreme Court Will Consider Education Ruling, HARTFORD
COURANT (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-ccjef-
supreme-court-appeal-0920-2ol6092o-story.html [http://perma.cc/269X-6SHY].
75. See Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W. 3 d 232, 234 (Tenn. 2002); State v.
Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 528 (Wyo. 2001); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Wyo. 1995).
76. See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 75, 78-79 (2016).
77. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014).
78. Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
79. John Fensterwald, California High Court Lets Rulings Stand on Teacher Tenure,
School Funding Lawsuits, EDSOURCE (Aug. 22, 2016), http://edsource.Org/2oi6/
state-supreme-court-declines-to-hear-vergara-inadequate-funding-cases/68350
[http://perma.cc/2RBF-WWA4].
80. Black, supra note 76, at 80-81.
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II. OLD LAW, NEW SOLUTION: TITLE VI AND TEACHERS
Neither the ESEA nor state constitutional litigation has ensured that teach-
ers are equitably distributed. But another federal statute might be the answer.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers another way to achieve teacher
equality within and across schools in a district, using a method that can operate
within existing law and that legal scholars and policymakers alike have mostly
overlooked. It also comes with significant advantages over the methods dis-
cussed in the previous Part. Title VI cases would focus squarely on teacher qual-
ity, rather than on broader questions of education financing. Investigations and
litigation would also benefit from the resources and expertise that the U.S. De-
partments of Education and Justice could bring to bear. The Department of
Education is required by law to investigate any complaints that have evidentiary
support, which ensures that private individuals can get some basic level of re-
view from the federal government. And, because Title VI requires agencies to
seek cooperation from those under investigation, it both allows for faster reso-
lution of cases and provides a level of flexibility in designing remedies that other
legal avenues lack.
As we will see later on, these advantages do come with drawbacks. Like with
any new legal theory, applying Title VI to teacher quality cases will require
agencies and the courts to iron out important doctrinal details. To determine
when there is a Title VI violation, they will have to develop standards for meas-
uring teacher quality. To decide whether to impose liability, they will have to
consider and respond to states' and districts' defenses. The Department of Edu-
cation will also have to consider how to adapt its investigative process to what
could become a wave of new complaints from aggrieved individuals. Finally,
using Title VI to get at an issue as politically charged as teacher quality could
lead to resistance: intransigent states or districts could challenge the agencies'
legal authority to pursue such cases in the first place. These concerns are seri-
ous, and should be borne in mind when considering this proposal. However, as
Parts III and IV will explain, these difficulties are surmountable.
A. Mechanics: The Structure of Title VI
Title VI is the Civil Rights Act's resource equity provision. It states: "No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance."" This means that federal monies come with an important string
attached. If federally funded programs discriminate by race in the provision of
resources, the program has violated the Civil Rights Act-and, thereby, has im-
pliedly violated the terms of the bargain by which they received the funds in the
first place.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
201
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
By all measures, this simple provision has had a major impact on America's
school system. A year after the Civil Rights Act passed, Congress enacted the
ESEA, whose main provision consisted of a "billion dollar aid program to local
school districts."2 The Act now grants an amount of money equal to forty per-
cent of the per-pupil expenditure in a state for each student who falls below cer-
tain standards for socioeconomic status.8 3 By providing a large carrot in the
form of grant money for disadvantaged schools, the ESEA gave federal agencies
and courts a big stick: the power to force districts to comply with Title VI. In-
deed, within five years of passage, Title VI transformed southern schools from
the most segregated to the most integrated in the country.84 This success led ad-
vocates to push for similarly worded laws to ban discrimination based on other
characteristics, including gender (Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972), handicapped status (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), and
age (the Age Discrimination Act of 19 7 5 )-'
What constitutes discrimination under the statute, though, is somewhat
contested. The bill never defined the term "discrimination," leaving this task to
the agencies and the courts. Indeed, during the debate over Title VI, Senator
Richard Russell of Georgia called the provision "the realization of a bureaucrat's
prayers."86 The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the language of the
statute itself only applies to intentional discrimination.1 However, the Depart-
ment of Education (DOE) has also promulgated regulations that elaborate on
and expand the reach of the statute. The relevant regulation states, in part:
A recipient [of federal funds] . . . may not, directly or through contrac-
tual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administra-
tion which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination be-
cause of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or na-
tional origin."8
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has promulgated an identical regula-
tion.9 The regulations thus prohibit not just intentional discrimination, but al-
82. Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Act and the American Regulatory State, in
LEGACIES OF THE1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 42, 50 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 6333(a) (1), (c)(1)-(4) (2012).
84. Gary Orfield, The 1964 Civil Rights Act and American Education, in LEGACIES OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, supra note 82, at 89-90.
85. Graham, supra note 82, at 50.
86. Id. at 48.
87. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
88. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2016) (emphases added).
89. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2016).
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so facially race-neutral policies that have the effect of discriminating against
students on the basis of race without proper justification.9 o The Department of
Education's regulation, in particular, is generally considered to require equity of
resources in federally funded school systems.' Through these administrative
rules, Title VI has "provided the chief leverage for national enforcement [since]
1970 of a disparate impact standard in minority rights."92
Title VI creates three avenues by which school districts can be held ac-
countable for discrimination. First, if an individual believes that a state or dis-
trict has intentionally discriminated against her in its provision of resources,
that individual can file a lawsuit directly under Title VI or under Section 1983.93
Second, the DOE or DOJ can, sua sponte, initiate an investigation of a state or
school district based on the results of periodic compliance reviews.94 Or, third,
an individual "who believes himself or any specific class of individuals to be
subjected to discrimination prohibited by" the regulations may file a written
complaint with DOE or DOJ officials within 18o days of the alleged violation.95
The Departments "will make a prompt investigation" if there is enough evi-
dence to support the allegation.96 In the latter two situations, the Departments
have an obligation to work with the states or school districts to determine if
they can remedy any violations voluntarily before initiating any sort of legal ac-
tion.97 If the state or district does not comply, however, or it is otherwise de-
termined that voluntary action will not remedy the problem, the Departments
can sue or cut off grant funding.'
Congressional sponsors put a great deal of weight on the idea that Title VI
would operate primarily through voluntary means. Senator Abraham Ribicoff,
who helped write the substitute amendment that became the final version of Ti-
tle VI,99 said that "[t]he withholding of funds would be the last step to be taken
only after the administrator or the agency had used every other possible means
to persuade or to influence the person or the agency offending to stop the dis-
crimination."' Otherwise, legislators worried, federal agencies could end up
90. See Catherine E. Lhamon, Dear Colleague Letter: Resource Comparability, U.S.
DEP'T EDUC. 6 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf [http://perma.cc/3WM7-DZ3A].
91. Id. at 8-9.
92. Graham, supra note 82, at 48.
93. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001).
94. 28 C.F.R. § 42.107(a), (c) (2016); 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(a), (c) (2016).
95. 28 C.F.R. § 4 2.107(b); 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b).
96. 28 C.F.R. § 42.107(c); 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2016); 28 C.F.R. § 4 2.107(d)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1).
98. 28 C.F.R. § 42.1o8(a) (2016); 34 C.F.R. § ioo.8(a) (2016).
99. See no CONG. REC. 7,o65 (1964) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
100. Id. at 7,066.
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harming the very students they sought to help by cutting off the funding that
paid for the students' education and welfare.'' Yet, at the same time, Congress
did little to specify what procedures the agencies would have to follow, or how
long they might have to seek voluntary compliance from federally funded pro-
grams, before moving to more drastic measures.'o2 The statute provides two
limitations: funding may be cut off only for the specific program found to vio-
late the non-discrimination provision, and programs must be given an oppor-
tunity for a "hearing" prior to any decision to cut off funding.0 3 But, while the
sponsors evidently believed these hearings would operate like formal agency ad-
judications-with written records and the ability to present and rebut evi-
dence'o 4-the statute does not incorporate any particular requirements.
Cutting off funding is not the only legal action an agency can take, howev-
er. In fact, other than a flurry of cutoffs in the statute's early years under the
Johnson Administration, the cutoff provision has been used exceedingly rarely
in the education context.0 5 In addition to the termination of funding, Title VI
authorizes agencies to enforce the antidiscrimination provision "by any other
means authorized by law.""o' Among other things, this means that agencies can
engage in civil litigation. Thus, DOJ can initiate-and DOE can refer cases to
DOJ to initiate-lawsuits against non-complying districts, in order to enforce
Title VI and the implementing regulations.10 7 This has been seen as a less drastic
way of ensuring compliance. Indeed, at least one of the Senate sponsors of Title
VI expressed his belief that "lawsuits to end discrimination, would be ... pref-
erable [to] and more effective" than withholding funds.os Before any such suit
can be filed, however, the appropriate official from the program in question
must be notified of the failure to comply with Title VI, and the agency must
then "determine[] that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means."0 9
Again, the statute leaves unsaid what steps an agency must take in order to de-
termine that the program will not be voluntarily brought into compliance. Ac-
cording to one Senate sponsor, all that would be required is "an informal con-
ference at which the noncomplying party [is] advised of the proposed referral,
and given a further opportunity to avoid litigation by voluntary agreement to
comply.""0 Litigation is thus a less procedurally onerous option than cutting off
101. Id. at 7,o60 (statement of Sen. John Pastore).
102. See HALPERN, supra note 1, at 37.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 20ood-1 (2012).
104. 110 CONG. REC. 7,o60 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore).
105. HALPERN, supra note i, at 294.
106. § 2000d-1.
107. 28 C.F.R. § 42.1o8(a) (2016); 34 C.F.R. § 1oo.8(a) (2016).
1o8. 110 CONG. REC. 7,066 (1964) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
109. § 2000d-1.
110. 110 CONG. REC. 7,o6o (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore).
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funding. And it is this tool that the Departments of Education and Justice could
employ to tackle teacher inequality.
B. How To Apply Title VI to Teacher Quality
Title VI has long covered a wide variety of school-related resources. The
first Supreme Court case brought under Title VI, Lau v. Nichols,"' dealt with
San Francisco's decision not to provide bilingual education services for around
1,800 Chinese students who did not speak English."' Courts have also applied
Title VI to affirmative action policies,"' segregated university systems,n 4 and
student assignment to schools,"' among other issues. The DOE, for its part, ap-
plies Title VI to the distribution of everything from extracurricular activities, to
advanced courses, to school facilities, to educational technology, to textbooks."'
In fiscal year 2015 the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) at DOE received 2,157 com-
plaints raising Title VI issues; the most common problems were differential
treatment or denial of benefits (849 complaints), retaliation claims (561), and
racial harassment (452).1"7 Inequitable provision of any educational resource can
be seen as discriminating against students or denying them participation in
school programs based on race or national origin.
Despite the wide Title VI net that OCR historically cast, teacher quality has
mostly slipped through uncaught. Teacher quality has been invoked indirectly,
as an aspect of bilingual education cases,"' but has received little direct atten-
tion until quite recently. One Dear Colleague Letter in 20o briefly discussed the
unequal provision of quality teachers between high-minority and low-minority
schools; it also highlighted court findings that students must receive equal op-
ull. 414 U.S. 563 (1974), abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
112. Id. at 564.
113. E.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
114. E.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 722 (1992).
115. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224,
1226 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev'd, 285 F3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), and opinion with-
drawn on grant of reh'g, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), and rev'd and remanded, 377
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), and aff'd, 426 F.3d 1162 (9 th Cir. 2005), rev'd and remand-
ed, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
116. Lhamon, supra note go, at 11-12, 17-19.
117. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DELIVERING JUSTICE: REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 18 fig.12 (May 2016), http://www2.ed.gov
/about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-and-secretary-of-education-
2o15.pdf [http://perma.cc/X74Z-CLJG].
u8. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001); Memorandum from Michael L. Williams, Assistant Sec'y for Civil
Rights, to OCR Senior Staff, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Sept. 27, 1991), http://www2.ed
.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/laul991.html [http://perma.cc/W32L-TYJ3].
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portunities to learn the material featured in high-stakes testing." 9 However, the
letter also described suits relating to the provision of educational resources as
an emerging area of the law."'2 0
In 2014, OCR finally remedied this oversight. As part of a larger Dear Col-
league Letter, it officially included "effective and qualified teachers" within the
set of resources required by Title VI to be equitably distributed.' 2 ' OCR noted
that courts have "repeatedly required equitable allocation" of teacher experi-
ence or training in Fourteenth Amendment cases,' 2 ' and proceeded to extend
this requirement to Title VI. For the first time, it laid out in detail how inequi-
table assignment of teachers can lead to OCR investigation, and what factors
OCR will consider in determining whether a district's actions violate Title VI. 23
This means that Title VI can be used as a means of ensuring equal access to
high-quality teachers, particularly within districts but also potentially across
districts within a state.1 2 4
The mechanics of Title VI specified in the statute itself, OCR's general Title
VI policies, and the procedures OCR laid out in its 2014 guidance provide a
sense of how Title VI teacher quality claims might go forward. First, as men-
tioned above, individuals or civil rights organizations could bring private law-
suits against states or districts, claiming that they discriminated against racial or
ethnic minority students in their assignment of teachers. However, this requires
them to properly allege intentional discrimination. 5 Districts must (1) treat
students differently in terms of resource provision on the basis of race, and
must either (2) not be able to articulate a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for
the differential treatment or else (3) articulate a supposedly neutral reason that
turns out to be a pretext for discrimination. 6 Plaintiffs could make out a claim
by pointing to a particular policy and showing that it created statistical dispari-
ties amongst otherwise similar students; the district would then respond to the
allegations of discrimination and the plaintiffs would come back with any evi-
dence suggestive of pretext.'2 7 This procedure is extremely similar to the three-
119. Richard W. Riley, Guidance on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to Education-
al Resources, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. 2, 4 (Jan. 19, 2001), http://WWW2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-2oolol-title-vi.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FUF-K9XM].
120. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
121. Lhamon, supra note 90, at 5.
122. Id. at 33 n.44.
123. Id. at 12-16.
124. Id. at i n.t.
125. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001).
126. Lhamon, supra note go, at 6-7.
127. Id. at 7.
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step test used for intentional employment discrimination claims under Title
VII.128
Today, however, intentional discrimination in teacher assignment likely
does not occur that often. Additionally, it is not entirely clear that courts will be
as lenient as would OCR in allowing plaintiffs to make a prima facie case.
Courts tend to apply Title VII's standards to Title VI claims, and Title VII re-
quires a plaintiff to provide enough information to "eliminate[] the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs" treatment and thereby
"create[] a presumption" of discrimination.' 29 This standard often requires
more than mere statistics; generally, "impact alone is not determinative."' 30
Courts must also consider the jurisdiction's history of racial discrimination, the
events and procedures leading to the practice being challenged, and any con-
temporaneous statements made by those who imposed the policy. 3 ' If a plain-
tiff can produce enough evidence, the program receiving funding can make a
relatively easy rebuttal to the prima facie case; the plaintiff then has "the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination," shown "either directly by persuading the court that a discrimi-
natory reason more likely motivated the [program] or indirectly by showing
that the [program's] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'32 With
these hurdles, intentional discrimination may be difficult to prove.
This leaves disparate impact claims, which involve facially neutral policies
"that function unfairly to exclude minorities ... without any sufficient justifica-
tion."' And, because only the agency regulations cover disparate impact under
current law, private suits would not be an option for most teacher quality
claims. (This issue will be discussed in greater depth in Section IV.A.) This
means that individuals will have to submit complaints about teacher inequality
to OCR for it to investigate. OCR can also initiate its own investigations.
To make a prima facie disparate impact case, OCR would ask whether a
specific, facially neutral teacher assignment policy has a negative effect on the
quality of teachers that minority students receive as compared to white stu-
dents.13 4 OCR's guidance shows that it plans to take a number of factors into
account when making this determination. First, it would consider whether a
state or district had implemented high-quality teacher evaluation systems, as
128. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
129. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
130. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
131. Id. at 267-68.
132. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th
Cir. 2014) (collecting cases holding that the Title VII burden-shifting framework
applies to Title VI disparate treatment claims).
133. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2522 (2015).
134. Lhamon, supra note go, at 8.
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these can help states ensure a more equitable distribution of teaching resources
across schools and districts.135 Second, it would determine whether minority
students tend to attend schools with less stable teaching forces than white stu-
dents attend, by examining teacher turnover and teacher absentee rates.'
Third, it would measure the qualifications, licensure status, and experience of
teachers in high-minority versus low-minority schools, as well as whether
teachers are teaching in their areas of expertise and whether districts provide
"equitable resources to improve teacher quality and retention."'37 OCR would
also consider whether students of different races have equal access to high-
quality principals and support staff."38
If OCR finds a prima facie case of disparate impact, the school district or
state would then have to show that its policy was "necessary to meet an im-
portant educational goal." If the district or state could not make such a show-
ing, OCR would make a finding of discrimination in violation of Title VI.' 9 If
the district did provide an adequate rationale for its policy, OCR would then
ask whether there are similarly effective policies that would result in less of a
disparate impact, or whether the proffered reason for the current policy is
merely pretext for discrimination. A positive answer to either of these questions
would likewise result in a finding that the district or state violated Title VI.1 40
OCR would then work with the district or state to remedy the problem through
cooperative effort.'4' If the offending entity does not change its policy, however,
OCR could then refer the case to DOJ for litigation, or OCR could even cut off
funding.
Whether done voluntarily through cooperation or against their will as a re-
sult of litigation, there are several ways in which violators could remedy teacher
inequality. Districts could put in place better training, mentoring, and profes-
sional development programs in an effort to achieve better teacher retention in
high-minority schools.1 42 They could place better principals in high-minority
schools in an effort to attract better teachers, or hire good teachers earlier in the
year before other districts snap them up.' 43 They could improve their own data
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 13-14.
137. Id. at 14-15.
138. Id. at 15-16.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id.; see Elston v. Talladega Cty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1412-13 (n1th Cir. 1993).
Again, these standards are borrowed from the case law on Title VII. See Ga. State
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (ith Cir. 1985),
abrogated on other grounds by Lee v. Etowah Cty. Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416, 1419
n.3 (11th Cir. 1992).
141. Lhamon, supra note go, at 21.
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id. at 22-23.
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systems, so as to better determine which teachers and principals see greater suc-
cess and why.'44 They could improve the physical conditions of high-minority
schools to provide teachers a more attractive working environment. 145 They
could also use financial or other incentives to encourage their best teachers to
switch from low-minority to high-minority schools.146
The first and the last of these options are likely to be the most effective.
Schools cannot simply fire their teachers and sweep in a new cohort of high-
quality educators. And in the early years of teaching, experience has a greater
effect on student achievement than "advanced degrees, teacher licensure tests
scores, National Board certification at the elementary level, and class size."1 47
Greater professional development and mentorship opportunities-especially
teacher residency programs and programs that use master teachers to train new
teachers'4 8-are vital to reducing turnover, and thereby improving the lot of
students in high-minority schools.
Financial incentives to transfer between schools are similarly necessary.
Empirical research shows that the key factor in predicting which schools teach-
ers tend to gravitate toward is the character of the student body.149 Teachers
prefer to teach in schools with lower levels of impoverished and minority stu-
dents, perhaps as a proxy for safety or students' learning ability."1o This may af-
fect where teachers choose to work when they first start out in the profession-
a decision that on its own accounts for sixty-five to ninety percent of later ob-
served differences in teacher quality."' Moreover, most of the difference in
teaching quality occurs between schools within a district, rather than between
districts or regions."5 2 And, when teachers transfer schools, it tends to be from
high-poverty and high-minority schools to low-poverty and low-minority
144. Id. at 23.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Jennifer King Rice, The Impact of Teacher Experience: Examining the Evidence and
Policy Implications, URBAN INST. 1 (Aug. 2010), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001455-The-Impact-of-Teacher.Experience
.pdf [http://perma.cc/RAS2-R4N8].
148. See, e.g., Partee, supra note 37, at 3.
149. Dan Goldhaber, Addressing the Teacher Qualification Gap: Exploring the Use and
Efficacy of Incentives To Reward Teachers for Tough Assignments, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 4 (NOV. 2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2oo8/n/pdf/teacher-qualification-gap.pdf [http://perma.ccdD9WM-XL441.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 13.
152. Id.
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schools within their districts. 153 Incentives to move in the other direction-
toward high-minority schools-are a crucial tool to counter this inertial pull.
Of course, both of these remedies would cost money. School districts could
well argue that they lack the funds necessary to combat the systemic problems
that create teacher inequality. Cost may be a practical obstacle to reform, but it
is not a legal defense to Title VI violations.1 54 Because districts cannot simply
plead destitution, Title VI investigations could force them to rearrange their
school budgets in a manner that local politics might otherwise prevent. It is true
that many schools with high minority populations also have fewer financial re-
sources,'55 suggesting that it will be difficult for them to implement the very so-
lutions most likely to guarantee better teaching. However, this may be less of a
concern than it appears at first glance. Only fifty-nine percent of the difference
in per-pupil spending occurs across school districts; the other forty-one percent
occurs between schools within a single district.''' This within-district number is
likely due to the same teacher salary differences created by discriminatory
teacher assignment. 5 In other words, districts already have some of the money
necessary to remedy teacher inequity. Moreover, because Title VI violations re-
quire heavily white schools against which to compare high-minority schools,
the districts most ripe for Title VI investigations are those with a greater racial
mix-and usually, therefore, a larger property-tax base.''8 High-minority dis-
tricts, meanwhile, will benefit more from investigations against states, as any vi-
olation would require states to equalize teacher quality across, rather than with-
in, districts. States will also be in a better position to afford the necessary
remedies than will individual districts.
153. Jennifer S. Cohen & Raegen T. Miller, Evidence of the Effects of the Title I Compara-
bility Loopholes: Shining a Light on Fiscal Inequity Within Florida's Public School
Districts, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 7 (May 2011), http://blogs
.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/florida-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LYW-
RCGP].
154. See infra Section III.B.
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These remedies, especially teacher-training and school-switching incen-
tives, are promising avenues for reducing teacher inequalities. But no district or
state has been forced to adopt them yet, as OCR has only just begun to explore
the relationship between Title VI and teacher quality. OCR has engaged in some
related activity: for instance, it recently started using Title VI to enforce the
race-specific remedies of NCLB that were discussed in Section I.B." 9 And DOJ
has often initiated cases related to discrimination based on the race of the teach-
ers-i.e., assigning black teachers to schools with mostly black students and
white teachers to schools with mostly white students."'o (It has, in fact, done
this for the past fifty years."') However, because OCR has only recently read Ti-
tle VI to include teacher quality, DOJ has not initiated any discrimination cases
in this area."' And OCR has done very little investigative work. OCR receives
approximately io,ooo complaints annually and opens around twenty investiga-
tions per year on its own.16 3 As of January 5, 2016, however, OCR had only re-
ceived twenty-one complaints that dealt even in part with teacher equity issues
under Title VI.164 OCR had also initiated five inquiries on its own that ad-
dressed, at least in part, equitable access to effective teachers.165 This makes for a
total of twenty-six cases in OCR's entire records system, out of over io,ooo inves-
tigations conducted annually-and only sixteen of them were still under inves-
tigation as of early 2ol6.6' Title VI has great power to bring high-quality teach-
ers to high-minority schools, but agencies have yet to fully harness it.
III. MAKING TITLE VI OPERATIONAL: DOCTRINAL CONCERNS
As demonstrated here, the Departments of Education and Justice have a
potentially immense power: the authority to ensure equal access to quality
teachers. Title VI, that dinosaur from the age of de jure school segregation,
could do more to improve academic achievement among America's poor and
minority students than the Every Student Succeeds Act or other forward-
looking statutes. OCR and DOJ have just barely begun to explore this avenue,
however. Ramping up enforcement of Title VI's prohibition on teacher quality
159. Kamina Aliya Pinder, Reconciling Race-Neutral Strategies and Race-Conscious Ob-
jectives: The Potential Resurgence of the Structural Injunction in Education Litiga-
tion, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 247, 270-71 (2013).
160. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
161. Orfield, supra note 84, at 102.
162. E-mail from Joseph Wardenski, Att'y, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
author (Feb. 6, 2015, 2:03 PM) (on file with author).
163. E-mail from Program Legal Group, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to
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discrimination could affect hundreds of districts directly and could affect thou-
sands more by convincing them to change their policies voluntarily for fear of
investigation.
But, like any new legal tool, there are a number of kinks to work out. As
discussed in the previous Part, Title VI disparate impact claims are subject to a
three-part test. First, a court or agency must determine that minority students
have lesser access to high-quality teachers than do white students. Second, the
state or school district being confronted must show the challenged policy is
necessary to meet an important educational goal. And third, the court or agency
must decide whether the state or district could pursue an equally effective policy
that creates less of a disparate impact. There are concerns that must be ad-
dressed across all three of these steps. The first step requires that OCR and the
courts develop a working measure for teacher quality, while the second and
third require those bodies to overcome districts' legitimate arguments that their
teacher assignment systems will be difficult to change. This Part lays out these
doctrinal pitfalls and illuminates pathways by which OCR and the courts can
avoid them.
A. Step One: How To Measure Teacher Quality
Title VI's power to equalize teacher quality depends on finding an answer
to a deceptively simple question: what makes one teacher better than another?
Researchers have spent decades trying to tease out whether teachers who seem
to be of higher quality than others are truly better at their jobs, or whether they
simply have better students."' Recent work confirms that it really is the teachers
themselves making the difference,'" but scholars are still trying to pinpoint
which measurable characteristics best correlate with the ineffable idea of good
teaching. 69 OCR must develop, and must convince courts to adopt, standards
for determining teacher quality in order to meet the test for a prima facie case
of disparate impact.
It is particularly important for OCR to take the lead on this issue because
judges may be loath to design clear standards on their own. Sticking their necks
out before the Department of Education develops focused standards could lead
to criticism that would jeopardize the courts' legitimacy in this area. "Policies
167. See COHEN & MOFFIrr, supra note 48, at 202; Raj Chetty et al., Measuring the Im-
pacts of Teachers I: Evaluating Bias in Teacher Value-Added Estimates, 104 AM.
EcoN. REV. 2593, 2593-94 (2014); MET Project, Ensuring Fair and Reliable Measures
of Effective Teaching: Culminating Findings from the MET Project's Three-Year
Study, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. 4 (Jan. 2013), http://www.edweek.org/
media/17teach-meti.pdf [http://perma.cc/A92Y-3B5V].
168. See, e.g., MET Project, supra note 167, at 4-5.
169. See Linda Darling-Hammond & Gary Sykes, A Teacher Supply Policy for Education:
How To Meet the "Highly Qualified Teacher" Challenge, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?
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that offer equivocation, delay, ambiguity, and even obscurity," on the other
hand, "offer political advantages."17 0 As shown in Section II.B, OCR's guidance
lays out five factors to which it will look when deciding whether there is a dis-
parate impact. Some of these factors, however, are considered more reliable in-
dicators of teacher quality than others. OCR may also have to quantify some of
their standards in order to reduce courts' discretion, which judges might other-
wise use to dismiss these politically charged cases."'
OCR's first factor-teacher effectiveness data-is both the most promising
and the most problematic. As OCR's guidance points out, states are "developing
evaluation systems that use multiple measures, including student growth," to de-
termine teacher quality.'17 Some of these measures, such as a combination of
student and administrator evaluations, have good empirical backing.7 3 Howev-
er, the idea of using students' standardized test results to evaluate teachers has
generated a great deal of controversy.
There are a number of reasons why districts must exercise caution before
relying on high-stakes testing. First, even the best tests are only able to measure
a small portion of the skills and knowledge that students are supposed to have
learned. 74 Results can also fluctuate based on test design and somewhat arbi-
trary decisions about what score constitutes adequacy or excellence."'7 And, be-
cause minority students are more likely to be in schools with worse conditions
and to come from worse socioeconomic backgrounds, they are also more likely
to perform poorly on standardized tests. This hurts the effectiveness ratings of
their teachers, even if the teachers are good at their jobs.'17
Second, there are certain types of teachers and certain student skills that
standardized tests cannot measure. The visual and performing arts, physical ed-
ucation, civics, and experimental science are extremely difficult to test in a
standardized manner. Standardized tests would either miss the purpose of these
subjects-by testing factual knowledge instead of skill development-or would
have trouble deciphering the impact of the teacher. Nor can current American
standardized tests adequately measure skills that are important for future suc-
cess, including socio-emotional skills, leadership, or love of learning.1 77 Addi-
170. HALPERN, supra note 1, at 296.
171. Id. at 299.
172. Lhamon, supra note go, at 13 (emphasis added).
173. See MET Project, supra note 167, at 6.
174. DANIEL KORETZ, MEASURING UP: WHAT EDUCATIONAL TESTING REALLY TELLS Us 9
(20o8).
175. Id. at 184, 316.
176. COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 48, at 203.
177. KORETZ, supra note 174, at 37; TONY WAGNER, THE GLOBAL ACHIEVEMENT GAP:
WHY EVEN OUR BEST SCHOOLS DON'T TEACH THE NEW SURVIVAL SKILLS OUR
CHILDREN NEED-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 119-20 (2008).
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tionally, it would be of little empirical help to give standardized tests to students
before the third grade; the children are too young to fully comprehend the test
instructions, and the conditions on test day have an even greater impact on
young children than on older ones.17' Together, these facts make it difficult to
use student growth as a measure of effectiveness for many teachers.
Third, even when looking at those classes for which standardized tests are a
valid measure of achievement, year-to-year test results are a poor measure of
teacher quality. Just as polls have margins of error.because they only contact a
few hundred people, teacher effectiveness measures also have margins of error
because educators teach relatively few students each year. This can cause large
but substantively meaningless fluctuations in test results for teachers from year
to year, making it seem as though a teacher educated her students better one
year but worse the next, even though there was likely very little difference in the
teacher's performance. 7 9 Unless student test scores are averaged over many
years, they are of limited value in measuring teacher quality. And in exchange
for these questionable benefits, high-stakes testing leads teachers to focus only
on the subset of topics being tested ("teaching to the test"),so and to concen-
trate their efforts on "bubble kids" who are close to the proficiency mark.'"'
OCR therefore must carefully consider how to use student growth measures as
part of its Title VI disparate impact analysis.
Luckily, OCR appears to understand these limitations and has advocated
for the use of evaluation systems with multiple measures."' There is some evi-
dence to suggest that value-added models (VAMs) of student growth, which es-
timate students' future performance based on past results and attribute the dif-
ference in their actual performance to their teachers, can properly measure
teacher quality if used in combination with student and administrator evalua-
tions."' In particular, evidence suggests that weighting student growth measures
178. David Berliner, Why Giving Standardized Tests to Young Children Is "Really
Dumb," WASH. POST (July 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
answer-sheet/post/why-giving-standardized-tests-to-young-children-is-really-
dumb/2011/07/18/gIQAB7nMI-blog.html [http://perma.cc/4XJW-9GNT]. Some
evidence has also shown that, even though the results of these tests are unreliable
when looking at young children, the scores can lead teachers to form inappropri-
ate negative perceptions of students, which causes harm to the children them-
selves. See Anna Weinstein, Kindergarten Testing: The Realities and the Dangers,
EDUCATION.COM (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.education.com/magazine/article/
testing-kindergarten-realities-dangers [http://perma.cc/Z98G-AV7B].
179. COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 48, at 204; KORETZ, supra note 174, at 168.
180. COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 48, at 203; KORETZ, supra note 174, at 244-45;
WAGNER, supra note 177, at 70-71.
181. KORETZ, supra note 174, at 195; WAGNER, supra note 177, at 71.
182. Lhamon, supra note 90, at 13.
183. MET Project, Feedback for Better Teaching: Nine Principles for Using Measures of
Effective Teaching, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. 3, 6 (Jan. 2013), http://
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at one-third to one-half of the total evaluation score, with administrative obser-
vations and student surveys each making up one-quarter to one-third of the to-
tal, can avoid the volatility of using only year-to-year student test scores while
still predicting future student achievement.8 4 If OCR trusts this data, it might
seek to use it as a baseline by which to measure teacher effectiveness and to
judge districts' own evaluation systems. While student achievement data may
not always accurately predict a single teacher's effectiveness, it can predict
whether a district is, on average, providing better instruction to its white stu-
dents than to its minority students.
The other factors that OCR discusses in its guidance letter-the stability of
the teacher workforce and teacher qualifications and experience-have better
empirical bases. However, there is still some disagreement over the specifics,
and over exactly how well these factors correlate with quality. For instance,
most studies have found that having a teaching license or a master's degree
alone has little effect on student achievement."' But having higher test scores, a
major in their subject matter, at least three years of experience, or greater levels
of content knowledge do tend to make teachers more effective.'"' Indeed, one
study found that "combined measures of teacher expertise-scores on a licens-
ing examination, master's degrees, and experience-accounted for more of the
inter-district difference in" student achievement "than any other factor, includ-
ing students' family income."17 On the other hand, a different study found that
equally weighting student growth, student surveys, and evaluations by school
administrators predicted teacher success better than having experience or a
master's degree.'88
The world of teacher evaluation is a messy one, but OCR can still create a
practical framework for Title VI disparate impact claims. As we have already
seen, Title VI law often borrows from Title VII employment discrimination
doctrine; this is another place in which a transfer of principles would be valua-
ble. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,s, for example,
the Court examined a claim that T.I.M.E.-D.C. and its union, the Teamsters,
were discriminating against African-Americans and Hispanics in their hiring of
line drivers for T.I.M.E.-D.C.'s motor freight business. 90 In doing so, it exam-
kl2education.gatesfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2o5/o5/MET_Feedback
-for-Better-Teaching-Principles-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/4T6G-RB7E].
184. MET Project, supra note 167, at 6-7, 14.
185. See Sean P. Corcoran, Human Capital Policy and the Quality of the Teacher Work-
force, in CREATING A NEW TEACHING PROFESSION, supra note 28, at 29, 31.
186. See id.; Darling-Hammond & Sykes, supra note 169, at 170, 172.
187. Darling-Hammond & Sykes, supra note 169, at 170.
188. MET Project, supra note 167, at 1o.
189. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
190. Id. at 328. Note that this case involved a systemic disparate treatment claim (i.e., a
pattern or practice of intentional discrimination), rather than a disparate impact
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ined the company's employment statistics from a variety of angles: it compared
(1) the percentage of minorities among the company's entire workforce to the
percentage among the company's line drivers; (2) the percentage of minorities
in particular cities where T.I.M.E.-D.C. had hubs to the percentage of minori-
ties among the company's workforce in those cities; and (3) the percentages of
the company's minority and white employees who were in the company's low-
paying serviceman and local driver positions.'9' As Teamsters demonstrates, liti-
gants and OCR would benefit from providing as many relevant statistical com-
parisons between teachers of white students and teachers of black students as
possible. If OCR could show that a district allocated its teachers within or be-
tween schools such that minority students had teachers with worse evaluations,
less experience, worse credentials, less background in their subject areas, worse
principals, and less support staff than white students, that would provide a
strong prima facie case of disparate impact.
OCR would also have to be careful with how it parses the statistics, as
courts have been rather picky about which groups plaintiffs use as comparators
and how they conduct their analyses.'92 In particular, OCR would do well to de-
termine a ratio of teacher quality for minority versus white students that would
act as a cutoff for disparate impact claims. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and DOJ, among others, have jointly adopted a four-fifths (eighty
percent) rule for employment discrimination cases: if a minority group is se-
lected for a position at less than four-fifths the rate of the most favored group,
the agencies will assume a disparate impact; a rate above that ratio will not trig-
ger this assumption.1 93 Courts have often adopted this rule in Title VII cases.194
Generating a similar rule of thumb for teacher inequity, along with setting nu-
merical standards for the many measures of teacher effectiveness, would help
tame the otherwise unruly process of establishing disparate impact.
B. Steps Two and Three: State and District Defenses
Though not as thorny as figuring out how to measure teacher quality, OCR
and private litigants will also have to confront and defeat states' and districts'
defenses. In order to prove a prima facie case, OCR or the private plaintiffs
would have to point to a specific policy that causes the disparity in teacher qual-
claim. But the discussion in the text is just as relevant to disparate impact cases,
which involve similar uses of statistics.
191. Id. at 337-38 & n.17.
192. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977); EEOC v.
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 751-52 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
193. 29 C.F.R. § 1607-4(D) (2016).
194. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Black v. City of Akron, 831
F.2d 131, 133-34 (6th Cir. 1987). But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion) (stating that the four-fifths rule "has
not provided more than a rule of thumb for the courts").
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ity-a seniority-based preference system for transferring between schools, for
instance, or late hiring at hard-to-staff schools.'91 The state or district defending
against the action could then try to show that the policy was "necessary to serve
an important educational goal," at which point OCR or the plaintiffs would
have to prove that there are "comparably effective alternative policies or prac-
tices that would meet the school district's stated educational goal with less of a
discriminatory effect.""'9 A state or school district might have several legitimate
defenses against a teacher quality disparate impact suit, which OCR or the
courts would have to take into account. None, however, would prevent OCR
from acting.
First, districts may be limited in whom they can hire. Most hiring is reso-
lutely local, since many teachers look for positions near where they grew up or
where they went to college.1 97 A policy of hiring locally could lead districts to
pick inexperienced teachers who have just been certified at local colleges, and
the higher turnover at minority-heavy schools could funnel inexperienced
teachers into those schools. Similarly, urban districts tend to have more trouble
than do suburban districts in attracting teachers;'9' this could create disparities
in quality across districts, for which Title VI might hold states liable. Yet a dis-
trict or state could claim that local hiring is necessary to fill teaching slots-
which is certainly an important educational goal. There is a major pitfall to this
argument, however: the hiring process itself may end up contributing to the ra-
cial disparities, discouraging more effective non-local teachers from applying
for vacancies. Some states, for instance, deny pension portability to teachers
transferring from out-of-state; some districts, meanwhile, deny salary credit for
previous positions, or cap salaries such that experienced teachers would have to
take a pay cut to transfer into the district.'99 Teacher transfer provisions can also
lead districts to hold off on new hiring until August or September, when many
good teachers will already have taken other offers.2 0 0 And, of course, the prac-
tice of local hiring alone can eliminate a number of more qualified candidates
from consideration. Courts consider hiring factors like these in Title VII cas-
es,2 01 and would likely do so in Title VI cases, as well.
Second, districts may claim that their collective bargaining agreements pro-
vide a nondiscriminatory justification for many of their policies. Two of the
policies most likely to create disparities in teacher quality-seniority-based
195. See Lhamon, supra note go, at 8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012)
(laying out the same rule for Title VII cases); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (same).
196. Lhamon, supra note go, at 8.
197. Darling-Hammond & Sykes, supra note 169, at 185.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 193.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977).
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transfer systems and salary schedules-are often features of collective bargain-
ing agreements with teachers' unions.2 0 2 Because more experienced teachers
tend to be of higher quality, and because high-minority schools have greater
turnover, high-quality teachers are more likely to be found at schools with low
minority populations. Seniority-based transfer provisions compound the prob-
lem because experienced teachers tend to transfer out of high-poverty schools
(which tend to overlap with high-minority schools).2 3 Fixed salary schedules,
meanwhile, prevent districts from offering financial incentives for quality
teachers to stay in or transfer to high-minority schools.20 4 Certainly, paying
teachers more as they gain more experience is a legitimate policy for school dis-
tricts to enforce. Indeed, it is arguably "necessary" to meet the "important edu-
cational goal" of retaining veteran teachers.2 05 Similarly, without a seniority-
based transfer system, school districts could find themselves in danger of losing
experienced teachers to neighboring districts.
If OCR or a court agreed that these policies were necessary to meet an im-
portant educational goal, the districts could point to the collective bargaining
agreements as a reason why they could not enact policies with less of a disparate
impact. The agreements, as valid contracts, are subject to the federal Constitu-
tion's Contracts Clause.2o' State constitutions also prohibit the impairment of
contracts.2 07 But the federal Contracts Clause allows school districts or states to
adjust contractual relationships, as long as the changes are made "upon reason-
able conditions and ... [are] appropriate to the public purpose justifying its
adoption."20s State courts follow this same test for state contract clauses.2 09 It is
possible, therefore, for districts to change their collective bargaining agreements
if needed. Moreover, as OCR has noted, "Federal civil rights obligations may
require a school district to renegotiate agreements, revise its personnel policies,
or take other steps to remedy the discrimination."2 0 If OCR or private plaintiffs
could show that districts would be able to end seniority-based transfer policies,
or provide incentives to teach in high-minority schools, without harming their
ability to maintain veteran teachers, collective bargaining agreements would not
stand in the way.
202. See Darling-Hammond & Sykes, supra note 169, at 194.
203. Cohen & Miller, supra note 153, at 6-7.
204. Cf Goldhaber, supra note 149, at 5 ("[I]n the absence of compensating differen-
tials, the two-way job matching process should therefore favor schools with more-
advantaged students, who will be better able to attract more-qualified teachers.").
205. Lhamon, supra note go, at 8.
206. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1o, cl. 1.
207. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § lo; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 3.
208. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
209. See, e.g., Romein v. Gen. Motors Corp., 462 N.W.2d 555, 565 (Mich. 1990), affd,
503 U.S. 181 (1992).
210. Lhamon, supra note 90, at 23; see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2016).
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Finally, states or districts could attempt to use cost as a defense. Several of
the most promising remedies for teacher inequity-more widespread hiring ef-
forts, improved teacher training and mentoring programs, and financial incen-
tive systems-could be quite expensive. Yet this is not sufficient to mitigate the
duty to act under Title VI.'" OCR or the courts may consider how a state or dis-
trict distributes its funds, and whether they can provide more funds, when
judging a disparate impact claim.21 2 Cost, then, looks much like the other de-
fenses we have surveyed. Districts and states may have valid, race-neutral rea-
sons for adopting policies that result in teacher inequities across race. But, in
many cases, they will still fail the Title VI disparate impact test: they may not
protect a sufficiently important educational interest, they may not be necessary
to meet that interest, or they may not be the most race-neutral way of achieving
that interest. Title VI, then, has great potential to change the way school dis-
tricts hire, train, and retain teachers.
IV. META-CONCERNS: THE COMPLAINT SYSTEM AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT
REGULATIONS
The previous Part discussed the doctrinal concerns surrounding Title VI
teacher equity cases. However, deeper policy issues lie beyond the three-step
doctrinal test itself. Teacher inequity is a pervasive problem in America's
schools. Agencies would be using Title VI to get at the prevailing political and
policy issue confronting education today, in a way that they have not done since
the days of school desegregation. Students, parents, and civil rights organiza-
tions will have to be made aware that they can complain to OCR about teacher
inequity. Moreover, with such a pervasive issue-one that cuts to the core of
education policy-the understaffed agencies might not be able to handle the
problem on their own. Litigants thus may also need to reverse the jurisprudence
prohibiting private rights of action for disparate impact claims under Title VI.
Taking on such an important issue through disparate impact litigation
could also put into question whether the regulations allowing for disparate im-
pact liability under Title VI extend impermissibly beyond the statute itself. Like
OCR's recent reading of Title VII to require equal facility provision to
transgender individuals, a robust expansion of Title VI to cover teacher quality
could generate political and legal resistance.2 13 States or districts might claim
that OCR's guidance is an illegitimate reading of its own Title VI regulations.
211. See Lhamon, supra note go, at n1.
212. Id.
213. See Alan Blinder et al., Countersuits over North Carolina's Bias Law, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/o5/1o/us/north-carolina-governor
-sues-justice-department-over-bias-law.html [http://perma.cc/2KJ9-N3TV] (re-
porting on North Carolina's decision to sue the DOJ over its determination that a
North Carolina law banning transgender individuals from using the bathroom of
their preferred gender violates Title VII).
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Or they could take a more expansive route, arguing that the disparate impact
regulations themselves are invalid. The Supreme Court's prior questioning of
the regulations could encourage such a challenge. 1 4 While this concern applies
to Title VI generally, rather than just to teacher quality suits, the greater and the
lesser are interdependent. The same capacity for widespread change that makes
Title VI teacher quality actions so attractive will also tempt regulated entities to
oppose those actions, and to put pressure on the regulations. At the same time,
the success of the entire Title VI teacher equity strategy depends upon the Su-
preme Court's willingness to uphold these regulations. As we will see, however,
there is a strong case to be made that the disparate impact provisions are valid.
A. Complaints, Cooperation, and Litigation
As discussed in Part II, most Title VI actions arise through complaints to
OCR or DOJ. Applying Title VI to teacher equity raises two issues related to the
complaint process. While a large number of states and districts may experience
inequalities in teacher effectiveness, private parties may not be aware of the op-
tion to complain to the agencies. And the more people who do become aware of
the complaint process, the less likely it is to provide speedy and just results for
the complainants. A private right of action would solve this problem by allow-
ing individuals to sue directly-but this would require changing either the text
of or the jurisprudence on Title VI.
Under the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval,"' pri-
vate litigants do not have a right to sue for violations of the Title VI disparate
impact regulations."' This means that all disparate impact claims must be fun-
neled through the Department of Education and the Department of Justice.
Anyone "who believes himself or any specific class of individuals to be subjected
to discrimination" must file a complaint within 18o days of the alleged discrim-
ination."I This may create a hurdle for private parties who are disadvantaged by
a state or district's allocation of effective teachers. The time limit itself is unlike-
ly to pose problems; the Court has ruled in the Title VII context that "[e]ach
discrete discriminatory act"-such as the annual hiring or reassignment of
teachers-"starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act."1118 Moreover, a
teacher equity claim under Title VI is analogous to a hostile work environment
claim under Title VII: each "is composed of a series of separate acts that collec-
tively constitute one" discriminatory activity." 9 Following this reasoning, the
Court has ruled that if "an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing
214. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001).
215. 532 U.S. 275.
216. Id. at 293.
217. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2016).
218. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
219. Id. at 117.
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period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by
a court for the purposes of determining liability."2 2 So too would it likely hold
with Title VI teacher equity complaints.
A bigger problem will be encouraging complaints in the first place. The
complaint system relies on two layers of knowledge: private individuals must be
aware (1) that a given action may violate civil rights law, and (2) that disparate
impact cases must flow through OCR and DOJ. But, currently, there is little to
suggest that either of these presumptions is true with respect to teacher equity
issues. OCR released its 2014 guidance document in the form of a Dear Col-
league Letter to district and state education officials.22 ' This was the first de-
tailed message from OCR that teacher effectiveness is a resource covered by Ti-
tle VI."2 While it was published on the Department of Education's website,22 3
there is no indication that this information has filtered out to parents and stu-
dents or to the general public. That OCR has only received twenty-one com-
plaints related to teacher equity under Title VI supports the intuition that the
public remains unaware of this legal option.2 4 OCR could help mitigate this
problem by working with civil rights organizations, which could in turn alert
local communities about the new guidance. OCR could also focus on opening
one or two high-profile investigations against large school districts or states
with real teacher inequities, such as New York City or New York State.2 25 The
publicity from these efforts could help inform the public that Title VI covers
teacher effectiveness.
If the measure of success is a higher level of complaints, however, then with
success will come a second, even more profound problem with the current sys-
tem. Under DOE regulations, OCR staffers must make "prompt" investigations
whenever a complaint raises a potential Title VI violation.22 6 But OCR has been
struggling to keep up with the existing level of complaints. Since 1980, when
DOE first became an independent agency, OCR's staff levels have continuously
dropped, down from 1,148 in 1980 to 540 in 2015 1 27-a 53% decrease. The num-
ber of complaints it has received in the same period has steadily climbed, from
220. Id.
221. Lhamon, supra note 90, at i.
222. See Lhamon, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
223. See Race and National Origin Discrimination: Policy Guidance, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/policyguidance/race-
origin.html [http://perma.cc/4BQ5-QAGJ].
224. E-mail from Program Legal Group to author, supra note 163.
225. New York State's Plan To Ensure Equitable Access to the Most Effective Educators
2014-2015, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T 6-7, 34, 213, http://www.pl2.nysed.gov/
accountability/T2/pdfs/FINALNYSEquityPlan.pdf [http://perma.cc/QH4Y-jQjMI.
226. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) (2016).
227. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 117, at 8 & fig.3.
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3,497 in 1980 to 10,392 in 201522'-a 297% jump. In fiscal year 2015, OCR was
only able to resolve 9,250 complaints, or over one thousand less than it received;
and even this number includes complaints that were received in previous
years. 9 Activists have also begun to shine a spotlight on the issue of sexual as-
sault on college campuses, which has placed even greater pressure on OCR's
skeletal staff: OCR had to handle more Title IX complaints from October 2012
to March 2014 than it had in the previous four years combined. 230 The more
successful OCR is at informing the public about the teacher equity guidance,
the less successful it will be at handling teacher equity cases promptly.
One way to mitigate this problem would be to restore the disparate impact
private right of action that the Court took away in Alexander v. Sandoval.2 31
There are three ways to do this. First, the Court could reverse the "unorthodox
and somewhat haphazard" set of cases that ruled that Title VI itself is limited to
intentional discrimination.2 3 2 Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation that
expands Title VI to include disparate impact. Second, Congress could pass a law
creating a private right of action to enforce the Title VI regulations, overriding
the Court's Sandoval decision. Or third, the Court could reconsider and over-
rule Sandoval, determining that a private right of action does exist to enforce
the disparate impact regulations.
None of these options, though, stands a good chance of becoming reality.
The Court exercises a "superpowered form of stare decisis" in the field of statu-
tory interpretation.2 3 "Absent special justification, [statutory interpretation
opinions] are balls tossed into Congress's court, for acceptance or not as that
branch elects."2 34 The Court is therefore unlikely to overrule its decisions on the
scope of Title VI or on the existence of a disparate impact private right of ac-
tion.
Instead, Congress may well have to override these decisions itself. This is al-
so unlikely. As scholars have recently demonstrated, Congress has been far stin-
gier about overriding judicial statutory interpretations since the late 1990S.235
Perhaps because the disparate impact regulations remain intact, or perhaps be-
228. Id.
229. Id. at 5, 43 n.2.
230. See Tyler Kingkade, Senators Push for More Staff at Agency To Investigate Sexual
Abuse at Colleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2014, 3:54 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/o4/o4/agency-sexual-assault-investigations-mccaskill-
gillibrand_n5092748.html [http://perma.ccRYD9-TMCC].
231. 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
232. Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015).
234. Id. at 2409.
235. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
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cause Congress has become more polarized, Congress has not overridden Sand-
oval. Scholars"' and activists" alike have called for a congressional override,
and members of Congress have introduced at least four bills that seek to over-
turn Sandoval by both adding disparate impact liability to Title VI and provid-
ing an explicit cause of action to enforce the federal regulations."' But none of
these bills made it out of committee."' The fact that Congress has not passed
one of these laws could provide the Court with yet another reason to uphold
Sandoval.2 40
Even if Congress or the Court were willing to overturn Sandoval and sanc-
tion private disparate impact suits, allowing private suits could also generate
greater animosity on the part of states and school districts, and eliminate the
buy-in that comes with cooperative action. The authors of Title VI designed it
to "put[] a premium on voluntary action."2 4' Accordingly, OCR encourages co-
operation with those entities it investigates, and likewise encourages those enti-
ties to work with their own stakeholders to resolve Title VI issues. 42 Litigation
rarely leaves room for such cooperative efforts. This could limit Title VI's oth-
236. See, e.g., Tanya L. Miller, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and the Incredible Disap-
pearing Cause ofAction, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1393, 1425-26 (2002).
237. See, e.g., Leon Friedman, Overruling the Court, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001),
http://prospect.org/article/overruling-court [http://perma.cc/8DYH-Y8QD].
238. Environmental Justice Enforcement Act of 2008, S. 2918, noth Cong., §§ 3-4 (in-
troduced in the House as H.R. 5896, noth Cong., §§ 3-4); Civil Rights Act of 20o8,
S. 2554, noth Cong., tit. I, §§ 102(a), 103 (introduced in the House as H.R. 5129,
noth Cong., tit. I, § 102(a), 103); Environmental Justice Enforcement Act of 2006,
S. 4009, lo9th Cong., §§ 3-4; Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary To Ensure a
Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, tit. I, §§ 102(a), 103 (introduced
in the House as H.R. 3809, tit. I, §§ 1o2(a), 103). One other bill sought to override
Sandoval solely by providing a private right of action to sue for violations of the
Department of Transportation's disparate impact regulations. See Transportation
Opportunity and Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 2019, 112th Cong., § 3(b).
239. See Actions Overview H.R.5129 - noth Congress (2oo7-2oo8), CONGRESS.GOV,
http://tinyurl.com/glyustx [http://perma.cclFFSH-K2ND]; Actions Overview:
H.R.5896 - noth Congress (2oo7-2008), CONGRESS.GOv, http://tinyurl.com/
hv4ak65 [http://perma.cc/F7GP-HF57]; Actions Overview: S.2554 - noth Congress
(2oo7-2oo8), CONGRESS.GOv, http://tinyurl.com/j7r5cl2 [http://perma.cc/TJP9-
3YAE]; Actions Overview: S.2918 - noth Congress (2oo7-2oo8), CONGRESS.GOV,
http://tinyurl.com/hutsdtb [http://perma.cc/Y877-22GD]; Actions Overview: S.4oo9
- 1oth Congress (2005-2006), CONGRESS.GOv, http://tinyurl.com/z9j8f2m
[http://perma.cc/7HGX-4QTH]; Actions Overview H.R.38o9 - io8th Congress
(2003-2004), CONGRESS.Gov, http://tinyurl.com/hun9dfz [http://perma.cc/N6B7-
SN8X]; Actions Overview: S.2o88 - io8th Congress (2003-2004), CONGRESS.GOV,
http://tinyurl.com/gmdy4gl [http://perma.cc/6UUK-62DJ].
240. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409-10 (2015).
241. 110 CONG. REC. 7061 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore).
242. Lhamon, supra note go, at 21.
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erwise great potential to help districts voluntarily implement needed programs.
If a district wanted to, or could be persuaded to, adopt financial incentives for
teaching in hard-to-staff schools or eliminate seniority-based transfer rules,
OCR could work with the district through the investigation process. OCR's de-
termination that it violated Title VI could even provide a district with a legal
shield against political fallout, or a legal sword to help it seek money from the
state or the voters. The toxic atmosphere of the courtroom could cause districts
to resist such remedies instead.
In all, then, OCR must clear several hurdles if it hopes to effectively subject
teacher quality discrimination to the complaint process. More complaints will
put strain on the understaffed office, and could lead to lengthy delays in con-
ducting investigations and negotiating remedies. Allowing private rights of ac-
tion would alleviate this strain, but the Court's decision in Sandoval makes this
a difficult lift. And, as we have seen, litigation may not always be the best route
to take when attempting to change states' and school districts' policies. Given
the informational difficulties related to the complaint process, and the difficulty
OCR and DOJ would have in handling a significant number of Title VI teacher
equity cases alone, private suits would likely be of value. But OCR investigations
will remain the primary means of enforcement.
B. Survival of the Disparate Impact Regulations
Finally, tackling the pervasive problem of teacher inequities would launch
Title VI into waters not explored since the desegregation debate of the 196os.
This could provoke great opposition and would likely end in a legal challenge to
OCR's authority to conduct teacher quality investigations. States or districts
could challenge OCR's guidance letter, claiming that it is not a valid interpreta-
tion of the Department of Education's Title VI regulations. Or, more seriously,
it could challenge the disparate impact regulations themselves. In Sandoval, the
Court left these regulations hanging by a thread: it assumed that they were valid
because neither party challenged them, but it could not resist questioning their
legality.243 Since teacher quality suits could well involve challenges to the regula-
tions, and since OCR and DOJ cannot conduct disparate impact investigations
without them, it is essential that courts uphold the regulations.
Any challenge to OCR's Dear Colleague Letter must be taken seriously, but
would be unlikely to succeed. The Dear Colleague letter is an interpretation of
the Department of Education's Title VI regulations. Courts generally defer to
agencies' interpretations of their own regulations.2 " But the regulations must
be ambiguous, the interpretations must be consistent with the regulations, and
the interpretations must be sufficiently authoritative. 45 Opponents of OCR's
and DOJ's recent reading of Title VII and Title IX sex-discrimination regula-
243. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001).
244. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
245. Id. at 461-63.
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tions to include gender identity have claimed that this reading was improper. 246
This suggests that opponents of Title VI teacher quality suits might mount a
similar challenge to the Dear Colleague Letter. However, the letter is an official
document, signed by a relatively high-level officer, and was designed as a gen-
eral policy statement rather than as a response to a particular lawsuit. 47 Moreo-
ver, the language being interpreted-"subjecting individuals to discrimination"
and "defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
[a] program"-is certainly ambiguous.248 It is more than reasonable to argue
that being provided a low-quality teacher would "substantially impair[] accom-
plishment of the objectives of' a school district. 249
More troublesome would be a direct challenge to the agencies' disparate
impact regulations themselves. There are two main methods by which Congress
or the Court could uphold the regulations. First, Congress could pass a statute
that extends Title VI to disparate impact discrimination or otherwise blesses the
regulations. This option was discussed in the previous Section.25 0 Or second, the
Court could reverse its decisions holding that Title VI does not encompass dis-
parate impact claims. As discussed here, there is good reason for the Court to
do this, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and as a question of admin-
istrative deference.2 5 1
The relationship between Title VI and disparate impact liability has a tor-
tured history. The Supreme Court encountered Title VI for the first time in Lau
v. Nichols, 5 where it approved a private disparate impact suit over San Francis-
co's refusal to provide bilingual education to Chinese students.2 53 The Court's
decision was somewhat confusing: it explicitly noted that agency regulations
prohibited policies that did not have a discriminatory intent and seemed to
consider San Francisco's actions as violating those regulations;25 4 yet it said that
it "relfied] solely on § 6oi," the antidiscrimination ban in the statute itself, to
246. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25-37, Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G.,
No. 16-273 (Aug. 29, 2016), cert. granted, 2016 WL 4565643 (Oct. 28, 2016); Blinder
et al., supra note 213.
247. See Lhamon, supra note 90, at 1, 25.
248. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2016).
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 233-40.
251. See infra notes 252-97. For an alternative analysis that reaches a similar conclusion,
see David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alex-
ander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 86-ioo (2004).
252. 414 U.S. 563 (1974), abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
253. Id. at 564-65.
254. Id. at 568-69.
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decide the case."' Five years later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,256 the
Court implied a private right of action for a disparate impact suit under Title IX
of the Educational Amendments of 1972,57 a provision that the Court stressed
was directly "patterned after Title VI."1 5' These early cases, along with authori-
tative decisions by courts of appeals,"' strongly suggested that Title VI banned
disparate impact discrimination.
Yet, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,26o decided a year be-
fore Cannon, five Justices determined that Title VI's scope was coextensive with
that of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Since the Court had determined in
Washington v. Davis that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to intention-
al discrimination,6 2 Bakke seems to have eliminated disparate impact from the
statute's ambit. However, Bakke asked only whether Title VI prohibited volun-
tary affirmative action programs, and the five-Justice majority differed in how
the Fourteenth Amendment (and therefore Title VI) would apply to such pro-
grams.263 In fact, two of the Justices who were in the Bakke majority on Title
VI-and Justice Stevens, who dissented in Bakke264-later insisted that Bakke
only applied to affirmative action, and that Title VI in fact prohibits some forms
of disparate impact.215 This morass of conflicting opinions left Title VI's scope
less than clear for decades. Other than a series of confused and fractured opin-
ions in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, "6 and some dicta in a
1985 decision,2 67 no Supreme Court decision conclusively determined that Title
VI was limited to intentional discrimination until Sandoval."'
255. Id. at 566.
256. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
257. Id. at 680 n.2, 717.
258. Id. at 694.
259. E.g., Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967).
260. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
261. Id. at 287 (principal opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 325, 328 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
262. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
263. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 308 n.15 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 308-10; Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463
U.S. 582, 589-90 (1983) (principal opinion of White, J.); id. at 623-24 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
266. 463 U.S. at 607-08 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
268. 532 U.S. at 280-81.
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As an original matter, however, there is overwhelming evidence that Title
VI should cover disparate impact claims under the Court's statutory interpreta-
tion jurisprudence. Recently, in Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 69 the Court held that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.270 In its opinion, the
Court held that statutes "must be construed to encompass disparate-impact
claims" when: (i) "their text refers to the consequences of actions and not just
to the mindset of actors," and (2) "that interpretation is consistent with statuto-
ry purpose."1" Title VI passes both of these tests.
First, the statute clearly refers to consequences rather than motive. The lan-
guage of Section 6oi of the Civil Rights Act states: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."272 In In-
clusive Communities, the Court found that the Fair Housing Act included "re-
sults-oriented language" because it used the passive phrase "otherwise make
unavailable.""' Likewise, Section 601 focuses on the person being discriminated
against. Unlike the Fair Housing Act, Section 601 uses exclusively passive
phrases, such as "be excluded from participation in," "be denied the benefits
of," and "be subjected to discrimination."2 7 4 Like the Fair Housing Act, Title
VI's text "refers to the consequences of an action rather than the actor's in-
tent." 275
Second, disparate impact liability is consistent with Title VI's purpose. Like
the Fair Housing Act, Title VI "was enacted to eradicate discriminatory practic-
es within a sector of our Nation's economy"27 6-in this case, federally funded
programs.2 7 7 Moreover, the Court has determined that several statutes with
similar wordings and purposes as Title VI allow for disparate impact, including
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, and per-
269. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
270. Id. at 2525.
271. Id. at 2518.
272. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
273. 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
274. § 2000d.
275. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2518 (2015). Just as the Fair Housing Act uses the phrase "because of race,"
Title VI uses the phrase "on the ground of race." However, while Texas argued
that this language foreclosed disparate impact liability, the Court rejected this ar-
gument. Id. at 2519.
276. Id. at 2521.
277. See iio CONG. REC. 7055 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore) ("The title [Title
VI] has a simple purpose-to eliminate discrimination in federally financed pro-
grams.").
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haps the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,7' as well as the Fair Housing Act.179 It
would be more out of step with the Court's jurisprudence to find that Title VI
does not include disparate impact than to conclude that it does.
Finally, OCR's regulations were passed soon after Title VI was enacted, as
part of an effort coordinated by the DOJ; the Act also required the regulations
to receive presidential approval.280 According to traditional statutory interpreta-
tion principles, "[a]s a contemporaneous construction of a statute by those
charged with setting the law in motion, these regulations deserve substantial re-
spect in determining the meaning of Title VI.""' And the regulations include
disparate impact as a prohibited form of discrimination."' A real reexamina-
tion of the law, then, would likely conclude that Title VI covers disparate im-
pact.
This point about deference bleeds over into the final method of sustaining
the regulations. Regardless of whether the statute itself clearly covers disparate
impact, the Court could determine that the regulations validly interpret or en-
force the statute. One path is through Chevron deference, the doctrine that
courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language."' It is true that the Court has held that Title VI is coterminous with
the Constitution.284 Other than Sandoval, however, these opinions were released
prior to Chevron,"' and, as discussed above, they did not conclusively close the
door to disparate impact liability.
More importantly for Chevron purposes, however, even the cases that sug-
gested that Title VI only proscribes intentional discrimination did not say that
the statute was unambiguous. To the contrary, Justice Powell's controlling
opinion in Bakke found that Title VI's prohibition on "discrimination" was
"susceptible of varying interpretations.""' Justice Brennan's partial concur-
rence, joined by three other Justices, said that "Congress specifically eschewed
any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be
shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doc-
278. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 308 n.17 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases).
279. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
280. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 341 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
281. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
282. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2016).
283. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
284. See supra notes 260-68.
285. Compare Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Guardians, 463 U.S. 582
(1983); and Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), with Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
286. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (principal opinion of Powell, J.).
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trine.""I These are clear statements that the Court considered the language to
be ambiguous." And, as Justice Stevens' Sandoval dissent rightly pointed out,
the majority in Guardians that read Title VI as applying only to intentional dis-
crimination did so as a matter of stare decisis, because that is how they read
Bakke.8 9 Six Justices in Guardians either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged
that Title VI's language is ambiguous."o Normally, reasonable agency construc-
tions of ambiguous language prevail.
Chevron's command to defer to agency interpretations is even stronger be-
cause Congress clearly intended to defer to the Executive. "Indeed," as Justice
Brennan's Bakke opinion stated, "there was a strong emphasis throughout Con-
gress' consideration of Title VI on providing the Executive Branch with consid-
erable flexibility in interpreting and applying the prohibition against racial dis-
crimination."' 9 This, along with the statute's breadth, provides strong evidence
that courts should defer to the agencies' interpretations. 92 The fact that the
Court has previously held, haphazardly, that Title VI does not include disparate
impact should not change this calculus. The Court's opinion in National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services makes clear that "[o]nly
a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agen-
cy's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces
a conflicting agency construction."2 93
Despite the Court's attempts in Sandoval to sweep the issue under the
rug,2 94 the Court has never definitively labeled Title VI unambiguous. Sandoval
was also decided before Brand X clarified that agency regulations could trump
court interpretations of ambiguous statutes.2 95 Brand X did not cover situations
in which the regulation in question existed prior to a court's interpretation, as
287. Id. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
288. Bakke also explicitly rejected a "color-blind" vision of Title VI, in favor of an
evolving one, which supports an executive prohibition on disparate impact. Id. at
284-85 (principal opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 336 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
289. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
290. 463 U.S. at 592 (principal opinion of White, J.); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); id. at 621-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 641, 643-44 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
291. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 338-39.
292. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005) (emphasis added). But see Sam Erman & Gregory M.
Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative Steps To Pro-
mote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 307, 376 n.294
(2015) (arguing that Title VI regulations may not receive Chevron deference).
294. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81 (majority opinion).
295. Compare id., with Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967 (2005).
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the Title VI disparate impact regulations did prior to Bakke. Nor did it decide
whether the Brand X rule would apply when the Supreme Court, as opposed to
a lower court, had interpreted a statute.296 (The few circuit courts to reach the
issue have held that it does,297 but this does not settle the question.) However,
there is a strong argument to make that, under Brand X, DOE and DOJ should
receive deference for their disparate impact regulations.9'
With the untimely death of Justice Scalia, the identity of his replacement-
and Justice Kennedy's views as the potential swing vote-could determine
whether or not the Court will take this path. If the Court does decide that the
296. Compare Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Brand X's
reasoning "would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this Court that
would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity"), with id. at 1017 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("According to today's opinion, the agency is thereupon free to take
the action that the Supreme Court found unlawful."). At least four Justices would
hold that Brand X does allow agencies to displace prior Supreme Court opinions.
See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519, 548-49 (2009) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). However, this issue has not been definitively settled. See United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1851-52 (2012) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) ("There has been no opportunity to decide whether the analysis would be
any different if an agency sought to interpret an ambiguous statute in a way that
was inconsistent with this Court's own, earlier reading of the law."). One student
Comment read the plurality opinion in Home Concrete as "allowing an inference
of Brand X applicability to Supreme Court decisions but not making it clear." W.
Matthew Pierce, Comment, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC: Mak-
ing "Ambiguous"Ambiguous, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 295, 315 (2012).
297. See Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012); Bakersfield
Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2009); Hernandez-
Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1248 (ioth Cir. 2008).
298. Alternatively, the Court could follow Justice Stevens' view, expressed in his Sando-
val dissent, that the regulations are proper prophylactic measures to implement
Title VI's ban on discrimination. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One could view Section 6ox's discrimination ban and Section 602's authorization
of rulemaking as "an integrated remedial scheme," in which "Section 602 exists for
the sole purpose of forwarding the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601." Id.
at 304. The sheer breadth of the delegation that Title VI gives to agencies allows
them to enact "prophylactic rules necessary to actualize the goals enunciated in §
601," even if those rules go beyond the more restricted reading one might other-
wise give the statutory text. Id. at 305, 310. In Guardians, five Justices said that
agencies may prohibit disparate impact through regulations as a way to "effectu-
ate" Title VI. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2 (1983)
(principal opinion of White, J.); id. at 617-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Given the
Court's affirmation in Inclusive Communities that disparate impact liability can
help uncover discriminatory intent, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015), the disparate impact regulations
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disparate impact regulations are proper agency interpretations of an ambiguous
statute, or that the statute itself encompasses disparate impact, then OCR's ef-
forts to ensure teacher equity can proceed apace.
The concerns laid out in this Part and in Part III should not in any way
prevent OCR and DOJ from tackling teacher inequality. They do, however, sug-
gest some strategic choices that the agencies could make to ensure that their Ti-
tle VI efforts bear fruit. OCR could begin by using its spontaneous investigation
powers to analyze major, politically liberal states or school districts. Such an in-
vestigation could provide the interest necessary to publicize the new standards.
It would also provide OCR with an opportunity to test its teacher equity guide-
lines in a jurisdiction that has a greater political willingness to cooperate. OCR
and the district or state could then work together to design innovative remedies
to alleviate the inequality at a price the jurisdiction can afford. OCR could then
move on to investigating jurisdictions that are governed by federal circuit courts
with histories of affording deference to agencies. This way, if they are chal-
lenged, OCR and DOJ would have a better chance of developing precedent fa-
vorable to them-both on the substance of the remedies and on the validity of
the disparate impact regulations.
CONCLUSION
Title VI is a traditional antidiscrimination statute and has generally been
treated as such. It may have sufficed to deal with racial segregation; this was a
purely "legal" problem. But racial discrimination, one might think, is only a
small aspect of today's broader education policy debate. Under this theory,
more policy work, rather than litigation, will solve the problem.
Yet this prevailing wisdom may not be so wise. Congress has tried to im-
prove our education system through the No Child Left Behind Act, and forty-
two states-many encouraged by the prospect of receiving waivers from the in-
creasingly unrealistic mandates of NCLB 9"-have also adopted the Common
Core curriculum.30 0 But these more discretionary policy innovations have met
with limited success. NCLB's unrealistic timeline for making all students profi-
cient in math and reading, along with its heavy-handed state testing require-
ments, led Congress to replace it in 2015 with the Every Student Succeeds Act.3 o'
299. See Caitlin Emma, The Price of Common Core Repeal, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2014, 9:16
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2ol4/o8/oklahoma-common-core-no-child-
left- behind-waiver-11o421 [http://perma.cc/4MQA-8KBT].
300. See Standards in Your State, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www
.corestandards.org/standards-in-your-state [http://perma.cc/W4DE-6NQB].
301. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Obama Signs into Law a Rewrite of No Child
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Meanwhile, the Common Core standards and accompanying tests have gener-
ated a great deal of political backlash, 30 2 becoming a popular target for ridicule
in the 2016 Republican presidential primary race.30 3
Employing Title VI to combat teacher inequality can add another valuable
string to the educational improvement bow, while bringing Title VI into the
twenty-first century. It can encourage, or force, states and school districts to
implement remedies that have a real chance of alleviating teacher inequity.
These include teacher training and mentoring, incentives designed to get effec-
tive teachers to transfer to needy schools, and many others. And precisely be-
cause it is legalistic, rather than prototypically policy-driven, Title VI is more
insulated from the vicissitudes of politics than are these more modern policy
initiatives. A more aggressive use of Title VI certainly will not solve all of Amer-
ica's education woes-but it would be a big step in the right direction.
302. See Tim Murphy, Inside the Mammoth Backlash to Common Core, MOTHER JONES
(Sept./Oct. 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/o9/common-core
-education-reform-backlash-obamacare [http://perma.cc/9CMM-BSRY].
303. Andy Sullivan, 2o16 Candidates Slam Common Core, but Education Standards Take
Root, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. io, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/republicans-common-core us_55fl79ee4bo93be5lbdb38e [http://
perma.cclRRP8-35941.
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